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Abstract 
We offer the first examination of whether the gold forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future 
gold spot rate. We find strong evidence that it is not, particularly at longer maturities. Building on 
Aggarwal and Zong’s (2008) approach to allow for investor risk aversion, we then examine if these 
deviations from rationality can be explained by behavioural factors such as market optimism and 
over-reaction to news. We find that forecast errors in the gold market generally suffer from 
overreaction to observed spot price changes but underreact to outflows of gold from Exchange Traded 
Funds. Further, the forward premium is found to be a consistently optimistic estimate over the full 
sample. Finally, while the market mood is shown to vary greatly over time, swinging from pessimism 
in the 1990’s to optimism after 2000, the forecast revision overreaction is found to be consistently 
stable over the full sample. These are significant, important, and consistent indications of seemingly 
non-rational behavioural effects in the gold forward market.   
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we analyze data from the largest gold market. The London Over-The-Counter (OTC) 
Gold Market’s depth and liquidity make it an important part of the global financial system with the 
value of spot and forward trading in, for example, 2011 worth approximately $13.5tn and $750bn per 
quarter respectively (Murray, 2011). This represented approximately 86% of all gold trading in 2011 
according to Lucey, Larkin and O’Connor (2013). The issue of the relationship between spot and 
forward prices is a significant one for market participants, whether from a hedging or a speculative 
perspective. 
In this paper we offer the first assessment of the ability of the gold forward rate to act as a predictor of 
the future spot rate, assessing whether precious metals markets are characterised by rational 
expectations. If rational expectations hold true, the forward market provides an unbiased estimate of 
the future spot rate, with the two prices being perfectly positively correlated and with an expected 
value for prediction errors of zero. Results from other markets such as equity and foreign exchange 
have documented systematic deviations from rationality (Aggarwal et al, 1995). Surveys of the 
literature (e.g., Engle 1996) have been unsuccessful in explaining such deviations using foreign 
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exchange models of risk premia such as the capital asset pricing model and trade frictions. Failure of 
this Forward Rate Unbiasedness Hypothesis (FRUH) could be as a result of one of two issues, or both.  
Firstly the market may not be risk neutral as assumed by the FRUH. Over the sample examined here 
the spot price of gold on a given day is generally greater than the forward prices in the early part of 
the sample indicating a contango relationship, as shown in figure 1. However it switches to 
backwardation regularly from 2008. This forward premium can be viewed as compensation for the 
cost of carrying gold in your portfolio. These costs include storage and insurance as well as the 
opportunity cost of interest forgone. A benefit can be earned from holding gold by leasing it. An 
earlier study by Kolb (1992) found that neither contango nor backwardation dominated for gold 
futures between 1957 and 1988. Keynes (1930) argued that forward prices will either be above or 
below the expected future spot depending on whether speculators hold short or long positions 
respectively. This is because they require a risk premium in order to hold purely speculative positions. 
As there is no long or short data on the forward gold market at any given time, here we will control 
for the general level of risk aversion in the market. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Or secondly, a number of behavioural factors could explain failures of financial markets to rationally 
anticipate future prices. These include behaviours such as systematic under or overreaction to news in 
the market; which has been documented in equities by Jackson and Johnson (2006) and in foreign 
exchange markets by Aggarwal and Zong (2008).  
Evidence on the behavioural aspects of the gold market is more limited than would be imagined for an 
asset that has such an impact on the emotions of investors (among the few exceptions is Aggarwal and 
Lucey, 2007). This paper will attempt to apply and develop the behavioural analysis used by 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Aggarwal and Zong (2008) to assess whether the precious metals 
markets are characterised by optimism or pessimism, and whether they over or under-react to new 
information. The information assessed here includes changes in the following variables: spot prices, 
forecasted spot prices, the forward premium, and changes in the holding of gold by Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETF’s). We assess these possible behavioural explanations of the failure of the FRUH while 
controlling for investor risk aversion.  
We also examine the evolution of the markets risk aversion and behavioural dynamics over time to 
assess whether the markets outlook is stable over time. Our data set contains a wider range of 
maturities than previous studies with 1, 3, 6 and 12 month maturities used. This allows us to assess 
whether long run factors affect the short run and vice versa rather than solely looking at the issue for 
the same maturity. 
Section 2 will provide a review of the literature on the FRUH and behavioural biases, Section 3 
details the data used, Section 4 will present the methodology and results, and Section 5 will give the 
conclusions. 
2. The Spot and Forward Rates Relationship 
2.1 The Forward Rate Unbiasedness Hypothesis (FRUH) 
The FRUH assumes that if rational expectations hold and investors are risk neutral the forward rate is 
an unbiased predictor of the expected future spot. It can be expressed as: 
  (    )                                                                      (2.1) 
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where Et represents the expectation conditional on information available to the market t, st is the spot 
rate and ft is the forward rate (Zivot, 2000). Baillie (1989) refers to this hypothesis as observable 
expectations. In levels we can express the hypothesis as: 
                                                                                  (2.2) 
Where     is the rational expectations forecast error with an expected value of zero. This leads to a 
regression in levels which allows us to test for unbiasedness in the forward rate. 
                                                                           (2.3) 
The null hypothesis is that β=1, α=0 and Et(µt+1) = 0. As St and Ft are generally found to have unit 
roots testing the FRUH requires assessing whether St+1 and Ft are cointegrated with a (1, -1) vector.  
Engle (1994) also shows the difference version of this regression equation as follows: 
            (     )                                                  (2.4) 
Where the null hypothesis that the forward premium is an unbiased predictor of the change in the spot 
rate is found to be true if β=1, α=0 and Et(µt+1)=0. 
MacDonald and Taylor (1992) also suggest  testing the efficiency of the forward market by using the 
forecast error (FE), the difference between the forward rate (Ft) and the realised spot rate at t+1 (St+1). 
The FE is regressed on lagged values of itself as in equation 2.5 below. 
            ∑   (           )
 
                                      (2.5) 
With the null hypothesis α=0 and ∑   
 
   =0. This provides a test of weak form market efficiency, as a 
finding against implies that using freely available market information it is possible to outperform the 
market. 
2.2 Evidence on Forecasting, the FRUH and Market Behaviour  
A large amount of research testing the FRUH has been carried out on the foreign exchange market. 
The theoretically elegant rational expectations hypothesis (REH) has very little or no support in 
practice. Estimates of   for equation 2.4 are frequently and puzzlingly found to be closer to -1 rather 
than +1 required by the REH (such as Gospodinov, 2009). Froot and Thaler (1990) look at estimates 
of   from over 75 papers and find an average value of -0.88. While still not providing evidence to 
support the hypothesis, Frankel and Rose (1994) argue that an estimate of   < 0 may only apply to 
floating exchange rate regimes, as when they look at European countries participating in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism the find an estimate much closer to zero. 
 
Evidence on whether spot and forward exchange rates are cointegrated is mixed. MacDonald and 
Taylor (1989) test for cointegration between the spot and forward rate for 10 sets of exchange rates 
over a 12 year period and find no strong evidence for cointegration. Hakkio and Rush (1989) test the 
UK Pound/US Dollar and the Deutsche Mark/US Dollar exchange rates and find that cointegrating 
relationships do exist. Aggarwal and Zong (2008) find mixed evidence when testing 9 currencies, but 
in general find against the idea that currency markets are characterised by rational expectations. 
Deviations from FRUH are particularly puzzling as they should provide opportunities for traders to 




Forecasts by equity analysts’ also seem to fail the rational expectations test. Kang, O’Brien, and 
Sivaramnkrishnan (1994) find that analysts’ forecasts are biased upwards. There has been conflicting 
evidence on whether analysts under- (Elliot, Philbrick, and Wiedman, 1995) or over-react to new 
information (Debondt and Thaler, 1990). Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts underreact to 
negative information and overreact to positive news indicating systematic optimism resolving 
inconsistencies in earlier work on the issue. Gu and Xue (2007) find that analysts over react to good 
news, but once earning uncertainty following extremely good news is controlled for, only their 
general under reaction remains. This evidence of biases in equity analyst’s forecasts can however be 
at least partially explained by their economic incentives. To gain access to the companies they are 
following analysts’ reports cannot be seen as negative and as sales employees they are incentivised to 
encourage customers to purchase stocks.  
 
However, such perverse economic incentives should not exist in the forward markets for foreign 
exchange or precious metals where participant errors can result in financial losses. There have been 
many papers which have tried to explain the bias found in forward exchange rates. Engle’s (1996) 
survey documents a number attempts utilising models that account for potential problems such as risk 
premia and trade frictions but they conclude that these have not resolved the issue. Other attempts 
have looked at peso problems and learning (Frankel and Rose, 1994) but the general conclusion is that 
forward currency markets do not fully conform to the FRUH remains (Aggarwal, 2004). 
 
Recent work has examined if behavioural biases can help to explain this non-rationality across a 
number of markets. Amir and Ganzack (2006) find that security analysts under react to new 
information. Aggarwal and Zong (2008) find that forward exchange rates are characterised by 
systematic pessimism and under reaction to new information. Ball and Croushore (2001) look at 
macroeconomic news and find that market responses to new information on inflation are consistently 
pessimistic. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) explain the theoretical underpinnings of 
under-reaction as overconfidence by market participants who put too much weight behind their 
private information and fail to make full use of public information.  
 
Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) argued that forward prices will either be above or below the 
expected future spot depending on whether speculators hold short or long positions. This is due to the 
risk premium they require in order to hold their purely speculative positions. Lewis (1989) examined 
predictions regarding the US Dollar using forward rates and attributed 50% of the errors to a learning 
issue and the remaining 50% to a risk premium. Mohanram and Gode (2013) find a strong link 
between the cost of equity, as a measure of risk, and analysts forecast errors for stocks. However 
Gurkaynak and Wolfers (2006) examine the market for macroeconomic derivatives and find only a 
very small risk premium. This evidence points to the need to include a control variable to account for 
risk as an explanatory factor in forecast errors.  
 
There is already a body of research on deviations from rationality in the precious metals market. 
Aggarwal and Sunderaraghavan (1987) find that changes in silver futures prices are predictable in a 
markov matrix framework using both the direction and magnitude of price changes. Aggarwal and 
Lucey (2007) show that psychological barriers exist at round numbers, such as 100’s. Cavaletti, 
Factor and All (2004) discuss the importance of psychological issues in the gold market. Aggarwal 
and Soenen (1988) show that gold prices have fatter that normal distributions but are weak-form 
efficient. Lucey and O’Connor (2014) assess whether bubbles occur in the price of gold and find that 
gold is priced rationally in relation to its lease rates when the variance of the relationship does not 
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have to be a constant. Samles (2013) examines the effect of the flow of news into the gold market by 
classifying news stories into good and bad news. The market is shown to have an asymmetric 
response to news, with greater reaction to bad news. Further, deviations from rationality are examined 
by Lucey (2010) who documents large differences in the mean returns of precious metals depending 
on the stage of the lunar cycle, although they are not statistically significant. This area of study is still 
in its infancy and warrants further scholarly research. 
 
3. Data 
We use the London Fixings PM spot gold prices, and 1, 3, 6, and 12 months Gold offer Forward Rate 
(GOFO) at a daily frequency. Daily data over about a quarter century are examined. Specifically, the 
daily data runs from the 17
th
 of July 1989 until the end of June 2013. We calculate the forward prices 
following the market convention of a 360 day year and a 30 day month (LBMA, 2008). Where the 
delivery date for a forward contract is a non-business day, the value used for delivery is the next good 
business day as is done in normal trading. This means that at times the delivery price can be constant 
for 2 or 3 days at a time. As in Aggarwal and Zong (2008), to make our results robust to this fact we 
estimate all models at a daily frequency corrected to show the market price for delivery on a given 
day and at a weekly frequency taking the Wednesday value which does not require correction. 
Whaley (2000) provides a detailed explanation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange market 
volatility index (VIX). It measures the expected future volatility over the next 30 calendar days 
implied by the market using S&P500 100 index options. This data point gives us a good measure of 
the level of risk aversion in the market at any given time. We use this data the period of its 
availability, from 1990 to June 2013. Total ETF gold holdings data were downloaded from 
Bloomberg and run from November 2004 to June 2013. Below we provide descriptive statistics for 
gold spot and forward prices, VIX and changes in ETF holdings of gold over our sample at the daily 
frequency. 
[Insert table 1 below] 
 
Forecast Errors (FE) and Forecast Revisions (FR) are calculated following Aggarwal and Zong (2008) 
but due to this paper using four forward maturities a slightly different notation is needed. The FE for 
the 12 month forward rate (FE, 12m in table 2 below) is calculated as the difference between the 
predicted spot rate at t and the realised rate at t+1 (tFt+1 - St+1). The FEt is the forecast error made in 
the markets prediction of the spot rate at time t, but not observed until t+1. 
 
FR’s are calculated as the change in the prediction of a future spot price at t+1, calculated as follows. 
At t-1 market participants form an expectation of the spot rate at t and t+1, which are t-1Ft (which is 
the forward rate, formed at t-1, which predicts the spot rate at t) and t-1Ft+1 respectively. At t the 
market revises its expectation of the spot rate for t+1 based on new information. The forward rate for 
t+1 then changes and is now expressed as tFt+1. The change can be shown as the FRt = tFt+1.- t-1Ft+1.  
 
For example assume that at t-1 the 12 month forward price for gold is $1500 (t-1Ft+1) and the 6 month 
forward price is $1400 (t-1Ft). After 6 months the forward price for gold deliverable at t+1 is the new 6 
month contract(tFt+1). This forward price will be different from the original expectation of $1500 at t-
1, say $1450 and this represents tFt+1. The FR is then the change in the markets expected price for 
between t-1 and t calculated as tFt+1 - t-1Ft+1, -$50 in this case. This FR is denoted as FR, 12m-6m in 




[Insert table 2 below] 
 
We test for unit roots using Augmented-Dickey Fuller tests with lags selected by the AIC and SCB for 
all the variables to be examined, with the results presented in Table 3 below for their levels and 1
st
 
differences. **(***) represent significance at the 5% (1%) levels. As expected, the spot and all 
forward rates are I(1). All forward premiums, changes in spot exchange rates, FE’s, FR’s and VIX2 
are I(0). 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Methods for testing the Forward Rate Unbiasedness Hypothesis  
 
We test the FRUH in two ways. Firstly we test for cointegration between the forward rate and the 
future spot rate as in equation 2.3. If Ft and St+1 are cointegrated with a (1, -1) cointegrating vector we 
have evidence in favour of the FRUH. Zivot (2000) argues that Ft and St also need to be cointegrated 
with a (1, -1) cointegrating vector. If these relationships are found to exist we have found a long run 
equilibrium relationship between the two prices, upholding the FRUH.  
 
We also regress the change in the spot rate on the forward premium as in equation 2.4 and test the null 
hypotheses that β=1, α=0 and Et(µt) = 0. If the null hypotheses are rejected, we reject the FRUH. This 
involves regressing a long horizon dependant variable, the change in the spot rate over 1, 3, 6 and 12 
month periods, on an explanatory variable, the change in the spot rate predicted by the forward 
premium. The dependant variable can therefore suffer from serious autocorrelation. Valkanov (2003) 
finds that regressions using long horizon returns can have poor statistical power due to the 
autocorrelation inherent in the data. 
 
This is can be dealt with using the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors as in Evans and Lyons (2005) who examine exchange rate 
forecasting. Britten-Jones, Neuberger and Nolte (2011) find that the Newey-West estimator suffers 
from a downward bias when the forecast horizon is long and the number of observations is small 
(until about 100 observations). As we have over 6000 daily observations and over 1000 weekly 
observations this issue not a substantial one here. Testing at the weekly level, where this issue would 
be less of a factor, should also help to assess whether this is an issue. 
 
Other methods to deal with this problem include Hodrick (1992) who uses a structured covariance 
estimator generalising the work of Richardson and Smith (1991). Ang and Bekaert (2007) use 
Hodrick’s (1992) correction for long-horizon returns and find that previous methodologies had led to 
the too frequent rejection of the null hypothesis of forward rate unbiasedness. Autocorrelation can 
also be dealt with through pre-whitening as in Sul, Philips and Choi (2005). But Britten-Jones et al. 
(2011) find that these three methods perform equally well.  
 
4.1.1 Tests of the Forward Rate Unbiasedness Hypothesis 
 
We begin by testing for cointegration between the forward rate and the spot rate as in the levels 
equation (2.3) following Johansen (1991), with the results presented below in Table 4. In order for the 
FRUH to be accepted the St+1 and Ft, as well as St and Ft, must be cointegrated with a (1, -1) 
cointegrating vector. Table 4 shows that a cointegrating relationship exists between gold spot and 
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forward rates at all maturities, but that the cointegrating vector is not (1, -1) for any maturity. This is 




[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows mixed evidence on the FRUH. At longer horizons the null of FRUH is rejected at the 
1% and 5% significance levels for daily and mid-week data. However the relationship between spot 
and forward rates at 1 month conforms to the null of unbiasedness. This long run/short run divide 
becomes more pronounce at a weekly frequency with 3 and 1 month maturities becoming unbiased.  
 
 [Insert table 5 about here] 
 
Overall the levels and differences methods used to test if the FRUH holds in the gold market seem to 
suggest it does not hold in the gold market. The cointegration tests are unanimous and the results from 
the regression analysis suggest that a relationship between spot and forward prices cannot be said to 
exist with much confidence for the gold forward-spot market as a whole. There is however some 
evidence that there is predictive power at short horizons. 
 
4.2 Testing for Behavioural Biases  
4.2.1 Forecast Errors and Revisions 
 
Two possible factors that could affect the markets forecast from a behavioural standpoint are that as 
the market processes new information its general outlook (optimism vs. pessimism) and its response 
to that information (under vs. over-reaction) are independent of whether the information received is 
positive or negative.  
 
Forecast Errors (FE’s) that tend to be positive reflect general optimism in the market while negative 
forecast errors show a general pessimism on the part of participants. Optimism can also be found 
based on the market’s reaction to different types of information: if it underreacts to bad information 
and overreacts to good information. Overreaction occurs when the market’s FR’s are of the opposite 
sign to its FE’s; i.e., a negative revision is too large and we observe a positive FE. Under-reaction 
happens when the FR and FE are of the same sign. 
 
All of the dependant variables in equations 4.1–4.6 below are expected to suffer from autocorrelation 
due to a similar overlapping problem as for the FRUH regression. Consequently, Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for all regressions to 
deal with this with the appropriate number of lags. We also test all models at a weekly frequency. If 
significant autocorrelation still exists we would expect the R
2’s to decline as the frequency is reduced 
but do not observe a significant reduction for any model.  
 
To control for market risk aversion as a possible explanatory variable for FE’s, FR’s and the forward 
premiums in all models in equation 4.1 - 4.5 are tested with and without VIX
2
 (following Banerjee, 
Doran and Peterson (2007)), but it did not change the results significantly. The COMEX Gold VIX 
was also considered but as it only exists from 2008 and is highly correlated with VIX (approximately 
90%), and so we employ the broad VIX measure here.  
 
                                                          
1
 Results for weekly data are available from the authors on request. 
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Following Aggarwal and Zong (2008) we begin by attempting to distinguish between the markets 
general outlook and the markets strength of response to new information with the equation 4.1a 
below. It examines the relationship between the markets mistake (the FE) on a particular day and the 
revisions to its expectations (FR’s) on that day. 
 
        (   )                                                        (4.1a) 
 
The null of no behavioural biases is tested by:      . A positive alpha points to optimism as 
when FR’s are 0 there is still a FE, while a negative alpha implies pessimism. A positive beta reflects 
over reaction by the market as the FE and FR are both of the same signs as discussed above and a 
negative beta shows general under reaction. 
 
Due to data restrictions Aggarwal and Zong (2008) implicitly assume that the relevant FR for any FE 
is the one with the most similar time period e.g. in our case the FR,12m-6m would be regressed on the 
FE,12m. As we have 4 forward prices rather than 2 we can regress all FR’s on each FE and, as in 
equation 4.1b below. This allows us to assess whether relationships exist between different maturities 
as in equation 4.1b.   
 
         (       )    (      )    (      )                    (4.1b) 
 
[Insert table 6a about here] 
 
Table 6a shows the results of equations 4.1a and 4.1b using daily data. We see negative and 
significant constant estimates for all time periods and specifications pointing to pessimism and 
negative betas indicating under-reaction by the market to news, though they are only significant 
between the FE,12m and the FR,12m-6m. The joint test for no behavioural biases is rejected in all 
cases at the 5% significance level for daily data. Weekly data in general agrees, but finds no 
pessimism or behavioural biases for FE,3m. FR’s seem to have some explanatory power at 12 month 
horizons but no real significance at the shorter horizon as the R
2’s are almost indistinguishable from 
zero, which is similar to the findings of Aggarwal and Zong (2008).  
We now add a control variable for risk aversion in these regressions with the results shown in table 
7b. We find that the constant estimates become universally insignificant at 1% and 5% with only 2 
significant at 10%, and these two disagree in their signs. For the FE,12m regression R
2
 increases by 
almost double though  the power of the model is still low at shorter horizons. Evidence is still in 
favour of behavioural biases at longer horizons but is now firmly rejected at short horizons. This fact 
is not surprising as at short horizons there was some evidence that the FRUH did hold.  




 is negatively related with FE’s and significant at all maturities. A negative relationship between 
FE’s and risk aversion implies that as risk aversion rises the market consistently underestimates future 
spot prices, indicating that speculators are long gold futures contracts. While no explicit data exists on 
speculative holdings for the forward market, when we look at the Commitment of Traders reports on 
futures positions from 2006 to 2013 we can see this is the case as in Figure 2 below. 




We can also examine the stability of our estimates over the period of our sample by running the same 
regressions on a rolling basis. In Figure 3 we show the evolution of our intercept and slope terms for 
the regressions with FE,12m with and without our control for risk aversion We begin by running the 
regressions for 1000 observations and increase the length of the sample up to the full 6000 
observations saving the coefficient estimates and their level of significance at each point. When 
estimates are significant at 1% they enter a shaded area. 
 
Based on the intercept, without controlling for risk, we see that the market was optimistic until the 
mid-2000’s when it began to change and became pessimistic for the late 2000s and continued to be so 
over the overall sample. When we control for risk aversion we see that the market switches between 
moods over the sample period but reflects a more balanced mood over the whole period. The slope 
estimates that point to systematic under-reaction is relatively consistent with or without the control for 
risk. The market is characterised by under-reaction for much of the sample; though when we control 
for risk a short period of significant over-reaction is present in the mid-1990’s. The markets risk 
aversion also changes significantly over the period.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.3 Past Information and Market Forecasts 
 
We can also examine how observed changes in the spot price over a prior time period predicts the 
markets FE which is made at t but not observed until t+1.  
 
        (       )                                                         (4.2a)                                         
 
Where PSCHt-1 is the prior period spot rate change (St-1 – St-2) over a given maturity. For a given FE, 
e.g. FE6m, we assess first how the change in the spot rate over the same period (6 months) that is 
observed on the prior day effects the markets FE over a 6 month duration (as in Aggarwal and Zong, 
2008). This allows us to examine whether the way in which the market incorporates this news causes 
FE’s. If the slope coefficient is negative it indicates over reaction to prior information and vice versa.  
 
We also test equation 4.2b to assess if the market is effected by long, medium or short run spot 
changes in making its predictions, rather than just the same maturity as in equation 4.2a.  
 
        (          )    (         )    (         )    (         )     
(4.2b) 
[Insert table 7a about here] 
 
Table 7a gives the results of estimating equation 4.2a and 4.2b for daily data. Estimates of the slope 
coefficient for the 12 month prior spot change (PSCHt-112m) are negative and significant for 12 and 6 
month FE’s, indicating that the market is overreacting to this information to a significant extent in 
relation to longer run forecasts. This suggests that analysts concentrate on longer run changes in spot 
rates in making their longer term forecast predictions but at shorter maturities FE’s are independent of 
prior spot changes.  
 
This relationship breaks down at the shortest 1 month forecast horizon. Here only the 1 month prior 
spot change is significant and a positive beta reflects under-reaction. These findings are replicated at a 
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weekly frequency. This finding of under-reaction at short and over-reaction at longer horizons is 
consistent with Jackson and Johnson (2006). 
 
Including risk as in table 7b does not alter the findings above but does change the constant estimates 
and removes their significance. Without controlling for risk in the model it points to pessimism as 
before. Including risk once again turns the constant estimates insignificant with negative forecast 
errors explained through risk aversion rather than behavioural factors. VIX
2
 is significant at all 
maturities bar 1 month. Allowing for risk aversion increases the adjusted R
2
 for all models. Figure 4 
shows how these coefficients evolve over time. We see again that they are not stable and that the 
market goes through different moods as time passes. However, since the early 2000’s the market has 
consistently overreacted to prior spot price change information  
 
[Insert table 7b about here] 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) develop the test, originally discussed in Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), 
to separate out market mood from its reaction to new information. They point out that the overreaction 
observed may be simply that, or market optimism. If the market overreacts to good information this is 
optimism. They should then also overreact to good prior information. Therefore, we separate the 
market’s reaction to news from its mood using prior period changes by grouping the prior period spot 
changes into low, medium and high quartiles. This will allow us to distinguish between reactions of 
different strengths based on the type of news. We look at the effect of news type on both FE’s (as in 
equation 4.3 below) and the markets forecast, the Forward Premium (FP) in equation 4.4. 
 
                                                                    
                                                     (4.3)     
                                                      
                                                                    
(4.4)     
 
Where the     = t-1Ft-St-1,        and        are dummy variables:        is equal to one when  
     is in the upper quartile for changes and zero when not.        is equal to one when       is 
in the lower quartile for changes and zero when not.        and        are interactive terms 
equal to       times        and      times        respectively.  
 
   in equations 4.3 and 4.4 measures the impact of prior period changes in spot prices on the FP and 
FE for the average values found in the middle quartiles. To measure the effect of prior spot rate 
changes in the lower quartile on the predicted change we examine      , while for the effect of an 
upper quartile change we add      . Systematic pessimism exists if we find a significant negative 
summed coefficient in the lower quartile (overreaction) and a significant positive       for the 
upper quartile. Optimism is found to be present if we reverse the signs on the summed coefficients. 
This gives us the ability to asses both the attitude and reaction of the markets to new information. We 
test the null of no behavioural biases as         and        . 
 
We carry out this regression for all maturities of the FP and FE coupled with all maturities of the 
PSCH in order to assess whether differing lengths of spot price changes have different effects on the 
dependant variable at a given maturity. Table 8 presents the results of equation 4.3 coupling each FP 
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with each PSCH for all horizons, examining the impact of prior period spot changes on the predicted 
change in the future spot rate. 
 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
 
At the daily frequency we find that the sums of       and        are positive and negative 
respectively and almost all significantly different from 0 at the 5% level, indicating systematic 
optimism. The market underreacts to negative prior period changes in the spot rate, giving a positive 
sign and overreacts to positive information, with a negative sign. This is consistent across all pairings. 
The overall explanatory power of the models is small with low R
2’s; as found in Aggarwal and Zong 
(2008).  
 
Our findings are again very much influenced by when we might have carried out our study.       
(Bad News) are negative for much of the sample period and our estimates of        (Good News) 
are very volatile. Again a consistent outlook is not apparent over the longer run, and for long periods, 
like the late 00’s the signs on the summer coefficients point to pessimism. Results are similar using 
weekly data although estimates of       are not universally significant. Including risk as an 
explanatory variable does not have a significant effect on the results presented above and the risk 
coefficient itself is generally insignificant.  
 
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
[Insert table 9 about here] 
 
Table 9 show the results of estimating equation 4.4. We do not observe any significant optimism or 
pessimism in the markets assimilation of prior spot changes for FE’s.  Estimates of the sums of 
      and        are generally insignificant. When they are significant the coefficients are 
positive indicating over-reaction to upper or lower quartile prior spot changes. The middle quartiles’ 
results for    are all negative and significant pointing to under-reaction to average changes. Once 
again the inclusion of a control for risk aversion as a factor has no material effect on the results. 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the summed coefficients when we regress the FEs, 12m on the prior 
year spot change. As in the previous graph we see long periods of pessimism (when       is 
positive and        are negative) and unstable coefficients. 
 
[Insert figure 6 about here] 
 
 
4.3 Past Information and Forecast Revisions 
 
Next we examine the effect of prior FE’s on the markets FR’s, again using upper and lower quartile 
observations but this time of the markets prior prediction errors, the FE’s. 
 
                                                              (4.5)     
 
       and         are dummy variables where         is equal to one when        is in the 
upper quartile for changes and zero when not.         and         are interactive terms equal to  
      times         and       times         respectively. Under-reaction to information about 
previous forecast errors in precious metals markets would show as positive slope coefficients and 
12 
 
negative if over-reaction is the norm. If the markets attitude is generally optimistic then β3 +β4 should 
be significant and positive and β3 +β5 should be negative and significant. We carry out this regression 
for all maturities of the FR coupled with all maturities of the prior FE. 
 
[Insert table 10 about here] 
 
Table 10 examines whether prior FE’s are explanatory drivers of FR’s. The results are that the 
combined of coefficients for        and       are always negative for all combinations with all 
lower quartile estimates FE,1m failing to be significant for longer run FR’s. This implies that the 
market’s revisions to its spot price forecasts overreact to the FE’s that they observe on the previous 
day. However we do not observe systematic optimism or pessimism as the reactions is not dependant 
on the type of information the market receives, it is always an overreaction. The R
2’s are also of a 
relatively high value indicating good explanatory power. As in the previous models, including risk as 
a control variable has no material effect. 
 
The relationship between FR’s and prior FE’s is much more stable than the others examined. While   
      is hovering around zero at times, both summed coefficients are generally negative pointing to 
a strong systematic bias toward market overreaction to past FE’s over the whole period examined. 
 
[Insert figure 7 about here] 
 
4.4 Role of ETF Flows 
 
The emergence of Gold ETF’s in 2004 created a very visible new source of demand for gold. As 
shown in Figure 8 ETF gold holdings have increased dramatically since their inception with a peak in 
their combined stocks of over 84 million ounces in early 2013. Outflows from ETF’s since then have 
coincided with large falls in the gold price raising the possibility that this provides easily accessible 
information for investors about the general market for gold to use in their decision making. We use 
this data to assess whether investors mood is affected by learning about changes in total ETF gold 
holdings. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 
Information on changes in the gold holdings of ETF’s are generally updated the day after trading 
closes (spdrgoldshares.com) but some funds do report a day or more after that. This means that the 
information on changes in how much gold is held by ETF’s is assimilated by the market in London on 
the day after the change in ETF holdings actually occurs. For this study we examined 67 ETF’s 
reported gold holdings on a daily basis. This data was corrected so that it reflected information 
coming to the market. Most funds gold holdings were delayed by one day to reflect the lag in 
information that could affect GOFO or the PM fixing.  
As in previous sections we use upper and lower quartile observations of changes in ETF gold holdings 
to assess the effect on the markets prediction errors, the FE’s as in equation 4.6. 
 
                                                                        




Where cETFt-1 is the change in aggregate reported holdings of gold by all ETF’s on the evening 
before GOFO is set and the PM gold fixing occurs. LocETFt-1 is a dummy variable which equal 1 
when cETFt-1 is in the upper quartile for changes and zero when not. DLcETFt-1 and DHcETFt-1 are 
interactive terms equal to cETFt-1 times LocETFt-1 and cETFt-1 times HicETFt-1 respectively. Under-
reaction to information about changes in ETF holdings by precious metals markets would show as 
positive slope coefficients and negative if over-reaction is the norm. If the markets attitude is 
generally optimistic then β3 +β4 should be significant and positive and β3 +β5 should be negative and 
significant. We carry out this regression for all maturities of the FE as in equation 4.6 and finally the 
same regression with the FRt as the dependant variable. 
 
[Insert table 11 about here] 
 
The results for the effect of ETF flows are that the combined slope coefficients are negative at the 12, 
6 and 3 month maturities. Only large outflows (lower quartile changes) of gold from the ETF’s (the 
low estimates) have a statistically significant effect on the markets forecast errors, normal flows and 
large inflows seem to be discounted by the market. This points to market under-reaction to large 
outflows of gold in the ETF data over the sample. The upper and lower quartile ETF flows have no 
significant effect on the markets forecast revisions while the average reaction is to consistently 
overreact to this type of information. This shorter time horizon gives stable estimates of the 
coefficients given in table 4.9 under a rolling analysis as in previous sections.  
 
4.5 Economic significance 
Table 12 shows the economic significance of the intercept and slope coefficient estimations made in 
the earlier sections. We do this for the first estimation from each of the previous tables to give 
indications as to the economic size of the coefficient estimates. For regressions where dummy 
variables are used, we take the central (normal) estimate to assess the economic significance of the 
model. We assess the significance of each estimated coefficient by forcing it to take a value of zero. 
This simulated estimate is then compared with the estimate where no restrictions were placed on alpha 
or beta. The mean FE12m, FR12m,6m, FR12m, VIX
2
, PSCH12m and Change in ETF holdings used 
are as reported in section 3. 
From equation 4.1b we can see that using FR’s has a very large impact on the estimation of the FE. 
The prior spot change also has a significant impact as measured through equation 4.2b. Using VIX
2
 
consistently changes the estimate of FE by 40% in both equations 4.1b and 4.2b. Despite the beta 
estimated for the PSCH in equation 4.3 being highly statistically significant it appears to be much less 
economically significant causing only a 7% change in the FP when it is dropped. The estimated betas 
in equations 4.4 and 4.5 also have highly significant impacts, while dropping the coefficient on 
change in ETF holdings from equation 4.6 causes a 23% change in the estimated FR. Some estimates 
alphas also have large economic effects such as in equations 4.1b, 4.3 and 4.6. 
[Insert table 12 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines rationality in the largest precious metals (gold) market. We document that the 
gold forward and spot markets in general do not conform to rational expectations especially at 
horizons longer that a month (there is some evidence in favour at the 1 month horizon). The forward 
price is generally not an unbiased predictor of the future spot price.  
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Drawing on the earlier work of Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Aggarwal and Zong (2008), we 
examine two possible reasons for these deviations from rationality, risk aversion and behavioural 
factors. Based on these models, we examine optimism, pessimism, under-reaction, and over-reaction 
in the gold forward market. The findings documented and discussed here are established as 
economically significant in most cases. 
The gold market’s Forecast Errors are generally found to be pessimistic. However, as expected, when 
we control for risk aversion using VIX
2
, we see a fall in Forecast Errors when volatility rises, 
indicating that speculators are long gold futures contracts. This is partially confirmed by 
Commitments on Trader’s data from the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. Further, when 
we allow for differing reactions to positive and negative prior information we fail to find optimism or 
pessimism. Forecast Errors in the gold market are only affected by large gold outflows in ETF 
holdings, but under-react to this news. In fact, the market’s mood and reaction to information has not 
been a constant over time. The market’s Forward Premiums overreacting to all news in the late 1990’s 
and being pessimistic in the mid-2000’s. However, Forward Premiums over the full sample are found 
to be optimistic, overreacting to good information and under-reacting to bad. This model also has the 
highest explanatory power indicating that prior Forecast Errors are a major driver of the markets 
Forecast Revisions. 
However, we find strong evidence that over the full sample period the gold market overreacts to prior 
spot price changes. The market’s Forecast Revisions are fairly stable with overreaction dominating 
over the almost the whole period examined.  
In summary, in this paper we document that gold forward markets do not conform to rational 
expectations. In general, they over-react and are optimistic. These deviations from rationality are 
systematic, economically significant, and not explained by plausible other economic factors such as 
market risk or ETF gold demand. Behavioural factors are clearly shown to be important in the gold 
forward markets.  
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VIX Change in 
ETF Holdings 
Mean 590.34 591.47 593.51 596.93 604.08 20.294 25.29763 
 
ST. Dev 400.23 400.01 400.09 400.24 399.56 8.079 189.5209 
 
Skewness 1.722 1.718 1.717 1.71 1.694 1.998 1.888 
Kurtosis 
(excess) 
1.824 1.811 1.813 1.797 1.747 7.064 22.63 
 Obs. 6250 6250 6250 6250 6250 6134 2291 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Forecast Errors and Revisions 
 
FE, 




Mean -38.26 -17.77 -17.26 -8.32 -7.58 -5.53 -2.20 
ST. Dev 116.5 80.86 83.460 57.718 60.45 50.307 38.00 
Skewness -1.399 -0.657 -0.353 -0.677 -0.2362 -0.872 0.1671 
Kurtosis 
(Excess) 
2.857 4.618 5.669 6.228 7.167 8.437 9.102 
Obs. 5997 6103 6125 6168 6190 6189 6233 
 
 





Spot Rate  2.96461 -19.5981*** 
VIX
2
 -9.61134*** - 
Forward: 1m  2.90844 -37.0326*** 
Forward: 2m  2.35541 -27.1167*** 
Forward: 3m  2.99609 -35.4100*** 
Forward: 6m  3.01068 -35.1164*** 
Forward: 
12m  2.61212 -35.7437*** 
FP: 1m -28.1523*** - 
FP: 2m -19.7006*** - 
FP: 3m -17.7254*** - 
FP: 6m -17.6420*** - 
FP: 12m -13.4304*** - 
S3-S1 -7.76657*** - 
S6-S1 -4.94034*** - 
S12-S1 -3.22574*** - 
FE, 12m -3.51976*** - 
FR, 12m-6m -5.50996*** - 
FE, 6m -4.84832*** - 
FR, 6m-3m -10.9656*** - 
FE, 3m -7.81184*** - 











Value P-Value r (1, -1) 
St+12m Vs. 12m Forward 0.008 49.297 25.731 0.000 0 
 
 
0.001 4.014 12.448 0.739 1 No 
St+6m  Vs. 6m Forward 0.007 47.721 25.731 0.000 0 
 
 
0.001 4.199 12.448 0.714 1 No  
St+4m  Vs. 3m Forward 0.016 100.690 25.731 0.000 0 
 
 
0.003 3.589 12.448 0.795 1 No 
St+1m  Vs. 1m Forward 0.155 1048.08 25.731 0.000 0 
 
 
0.001 3.406 12.448 0.818 1 No 
 
Table 5: Differences test for FRUH  
 
 
α β Null 
S Vs. F: 12m 45.44 [0.133] 0.526 [0.674] 0.135 
 30.27 1.127  
S Vs. F: 6m 25.20 [0.035] --0.191 [0.064] 0.091 
 11.95 0.645  
S Vs. F: 3m 10.81 [0.066] -0.002 [0.041] 0.100 
 5.884 0.491  
S Vs. F: 1m 3.425[0.064] -0.083 [0.000] 0.000 
 1.855 0.141  
Note: We test equation 2.4 using OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors, showing α and β as the 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are given in italics below the coefficients. P-values for the null 
hypotheses (β=1, α=0) are given in parenthesis next to the coefficient estimate. P-values for jointly 
testing the null of β=1, α=0 are given in the null column. Maximum lag length set = 4(t/2100)2/9) as 





Table 6a: Test for behavioural biases, Daily  
Note: SE’s are given below the coefficient estimates in italics with ***, **, and * indicating 
significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level. All regressions use Newey-West HAC standard errors.   
 
Table 6b: Test for behavioural biases, Daily with Risk 
Note: SE’s are given below the coefficient estimates in italics with ***, **, and * indicating 




Α FR,12M-6M FR,6M-3M FR,3M-1M R2 Null 
FE,12m -30.793*** -0.429***   0.075 0.000 
 
4.625 0.119     
 -30.741*** -0.482*** 0.032 0.104 0.076 0.000 
 4.631 0.140 0.215 0.231   
FE,6m -16.541***  -0.059  0.001 0.000 
 3.404  0.096    
 -16.19*** -0.095 0.041 -0.018 0.005  
 2.971 0.114 0.185 0.151   
FE,3m -7.267***   -0.033 0.000 0.009 
 2.481   0.112   
 -5.868** -0.106 0.035 0.024 0.010 0.0335 
 2.520 0.065 0.102 0.102   
Dependant 
Variable 







FE,12m -4.013 -0.439***   -0.054*** 0.126 0.000 
 
6.684 0.122   0.012   
 -3.481 -0.513*** 0.047 0.143 -0.055*** 0.129 0.0004 
 6.417 0.135 0.191 0.217 0.011   
FE,6m -7.312*  -0.062  -0.020*** 0.015 0.198 
 4.417  0.097  .007   
 -6.085 -0.104 0.042 -0.006 -0.020*** 0.019 0.482 
 4.075 0.114 0.184 0.150 0.006   
FE,3m 0.890   -0.028 -0.016*** 0.018 0.924 
 3.778   0.086 0.006   
 2.658* -0.114 0.038 0.036 -0.017*** 0.030 0.470 




Table 7a: Prior Spot rate change as a determinant of forecast error, Daily data 
Dependant 
Variable 
   
Α 
PSCHt-
112m PSCHt-16m PSCHt-13m PSCHt-11m R
2
 
FE12m -22.046*** -0.338***    0.096 
 
4.472 0.075     
 -21.97*** -0.276*** -0.182 0.002 0.363* 0.108 
 4.311 0.096 0.183 0.203 0.220  
FE6m -15.85***  -0.072   0.004 
 
2.899  0.0717    
 -9.319*** -0.290*** 0.228 -0.010 0.148 0.068 
 2.925 0.075 0.148 0.175 0.153  
FE3m -6.736***   -0.048  0.001 
 
2.577   0.076   
 -3.447 -0.101* 0.024 -0.017 0.139 0.043 
 2.418 0.060 0.107 0.102 0.113  
FE1m -2.700**    0.124** 0.019 
 1.380    0.070  
 -1.062 -0.015 -0.030 -0.043 0.207*** 0.037 
 1.366 0.032 0.055 0.064 0.069  
Note: SE’s are given below the coefficient estimates in italics with ***, **, and * indicating 
significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level. All regressions use Newey-West HAC standard errors.   
Table 7b: Prior Spot rate change as a determinant of forecast error, Daily data with risk 
Dependant 
Variable 












FE12m 2.690 -0.325***    -0.051*** 0.143 
 
6.793 0.078    0.010  
FE12m 3.921 -0.263*** -0.222 0.0294 0.375* -0.053*** 0.143 
 6.606 0.088 0.165 0.198 0.217 0.011  
FE6m -5.866  -0.074   -0.020*** 0.017 
 
4.084  0.072   0.006  
 -0.264 -0.284*** 0.215 -0.004 0.152 -0.018*** 0.080 
 4.016 0.073 0.146 0.177 0.155 0.005  
FE3m 1.327   -0.047  -0.016*** 0.019 
 
3.858   0.076  0.006  
 4.623 -0.096* 0.012 -0.009 0.142 -0.016*** 0.044 
 3.858 0.059 0.104 0.102 0.115 0.006  
FE1m -1.137    0.125* -0.003 0.016 
 2.162    0.069 0.004  
 0.339 -0.014 -0.031 -0.041 0.208** -0.002 0.033 
 2.383 0.031 0.055 0.065 0.069 0.004  
Note: SE’s are given below the coefficient estimates in italics with ***, **, and * indicating 









Low Normal High   
α β α β α β R
2
 
FP12m 12m 13.322 0.049 14.100 -0.063 25.370 -0.043 0.073 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  6m 15.549 0.040 13.125 -0.020 18.800 -0.031 0.026 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.025   
  3m 15.783 0.054 13.350 -0.090 18.020 -0.034 0.029 
  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.035   
FP 6m 12m 6.354 0.018 6.888 -0.041 14.247 -0.031 0.040 
  
 
0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  6m 7.327 0.016 6.429 -0.017 11.220 -0.033 0.020 
  
 
0.000 0.033 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.009   
  3m 7.652 0.025 6.550 -0.043 10.783 -0.048 0.027 
  
 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.001   
FP 3m 12m 3.213 0.013 3.390 -0.019 6.723 -0.015 0.020 
  
 
0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  6m 3.800 0.012 3.198 -0.010 4.680 -0.012 0.009 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.026   
  3m 3.786 0.016 3.244 -0.023 4.490 -0.016 0.009 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.013   
 
Note: P-values’ are given below the coefficient estimates in italics. All regressions use Newey-West 
HAC standard errors.   
 
 




Low Normal High   
α β α β α β R
2
 
FE 12m 12m 6.837 0.247 -2.168 -1.079 -131.548 0.090 0.149 
  0.551 0.511 0.564 0.000 0.000 0.441  
 6m 27.882 0.809 -7.439 -1.034 -154.212 0.254 0.189 
  0.006 0.022 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.104  
 3m -10.659 0.316 -15.260 -1.730 -94.471 0.058 0.076 
  0.335 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.798  
FE 6m 12m -3.946 -0.154 1.999 -0.694 60.939 0.031 0.070 
  0.462 0.295 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.701  
 6m 20.969 0.801 -4.137 -0.539 -56.740 0.123 0.064 
  0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.258  
 3m -4.785 0.247 -8.377 -0.787 -48.570 0.204 0.022 
  0.459 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103  
FE 3m 12m 0.820 -0.131 1.283 -0.296 -53.847 0.119 0.057 
22 
 
  0.923 0.605 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.038  
 6m -1.532 0.011 -1.726 -0.076 -38.112 0.121 0.025 
  0.811 0.964 0.211 0.348 0.000 0.120  
 3m -3.879 -0.047 -2.794 -0.369 -35.270 0.203 0.022 
  0.470 0.801 0.052 0.001 0.000 0.031  
Note: P-values’ are given below the coefficient estimates in italics. All regressions use Newey-West 





Table 10: Determinants of forecast revision (OLS) Daily 
Dependant 
Variable 
  Low Normal High   
      α β α β α β R
2
 
FR12m6m 12m -22.686 -0.593 2.222 -0.434 30.382 -1.082 0.600 
  
 
0.053 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  6m 4.408 -0.951 -0.565 -1.020 -0.697 -1.009 0.964 
  
 
0.015 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.291 0.000   
  3m 14.468 -1.037 0.592 -1.170 11.162 -0.839 0.553 
  
 
0.035 0.000 0.692 0.094 0.000 0.000   
  1m 12.090 -1.433 -2.160 -1.100 9.570 -0.268 0.302 
  
 0.098 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.261 0.423   
FR6m3m 12m -26.087 -0.362 1.233 -0.213 19.843 -0.617 0.334 
  
 
0.038 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.146 0.000   
  6m -14.886 -0.590 -0.086 -0.404 7.554 -0.636 0.532 
  
 
0.069 0.000 0.927 0.000 0.003 0.000   
  3m 0.843 -0.960 -0.013 -1.004 -1.317 -0.949 0.942 
  
 
0.399 0.000 0.939 0.000 0.083 0.000   
  1m 4.938 -1.076 -1.969 -0.946 2.266 -0.516 0.349 
  
 0.363 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.715 0.041   
FR3m1m 12m -29.445 -0.309 0.435 -0.153 18.145 -0.508 0.262 
  
 
0.025 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.093 0.015   
  6m -22.686 -0.493 -0.986 -0.285 12.484 -0.518 0.373 
  
 
0.022 0.000 0.319 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  3m -11.155 -0.779 -1.025 -0.654 -0.232 -0.580 0.578 
  
 
0.026 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.942 0.000   
  1m 2.092 -1.023 -0.961 -0.963 -3.193 -0.589 0.440 
    0.698 0.000 0.22 0.000 0.339 0.000   
Note: P-values’ are given below the coefficient estimates in italics. All regressions use Newey-West 





Table 11: Forecast Errors, Forecast Revisions and ETF flows (OLS) Daily 
Dependant 
Variable 
Low Normal High   
α β α β α β R2 
FE12m -137.000 -0.144 -111.300 -0.027 -102.700 -0.013 0.026 
  0.000 0.018 0.000 0.932 0.000 0.655   
FE6m -45.863 -0.012 -48.784 -0.089 -52.060 -0.132 0.022 
  0.000 0.032 0.000 0.758 0.009 0.566   
FE3m -1.027 -0.111 -18.699 -0.202 -26.444 -0.007 0.061 
  0.929 0.010 0.000 0.285 0.004 0.756   
FE1m 0.063 0.007 -5.437 -0.235 -0.108 -0.040 0.017 
  0.993 0.117 0.196 0.024 0.110 0.633   
FR12m6m 63.539 0.068 55.797 0.649 68.873 -0.015 0.012 
  0.000 0.167 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.704   
FR6m3m 18.495 0.054 21.264 0.322 36.322 -0.004 0.012 
  0.090 0.119 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.884   
FR3m1m 12.792 0.080 11.795 0.156 22.957 -0.002 0.019 
  0.155 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.952   
Note: P-values’ are given below the coefficient estimates in italics. All regressions use Newey-West 











Table 12: Sample of the Economic Significance of Estimates 
Average Values and Model Estimates of the Coefficients 
       (1)                (2)                 (3)             (4)           (5)                   (6) 
Average 
estimate (7) 
Economic Significance of Estimates 
    (8)                  (9)          (10)              (11)            (12)                (13) 
Equ 4.1b    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ α β(FR) β(VIX
2
) Est. of FE β(FR)=0 Change α =0 Change β (Vix)=0 Change 
FE,12m -17.77 20.294 -4.01 -0.439 -0.054 2.692 -5.108 290% 6.705 149% 1.596 41% 
Equ 4.2b        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  α β(PSCH) β(VIX
2
) Est. of FE 
β(PSCH)=
0 
Change α =0 Change β (Vix)=0 
Change 
FE,12m 52.37 20.294 2.69 -0.325 -0.51 -24.680 -7.650 69% -27.370 11% -35.030 
42% 
Equ 4.3        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  α β(PSCH)  Est of FP 
β(PSCH)=
0 
Change α =0 Change   
  
FP,12m 13.82  14.1 -0.063  13.229 14.100 7% -0.870 107%     
Equ 4.4        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  α β(PSCH)  Est of FE 
β(PSCH)=
0 
Change α =0 Change   
  
FE,12m 52.37  -2.16 -1.079  -58.675 -2.168 96% -56.507 4%     
Equ 4.5      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   α β(FE)  Est of FR β(FE)=0 Change α =0 Change     
FR12m,6m -38.26  2.22 -0.434  18.826 2.222 88% 16.604 12%     
Equ 4.6     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  α Β(ETF)  Est of FR β (ETF)=0 Change α =0 Change 
 
  
FR12m,6m 25.297  55.7 0.649  72.214 55.797 23% 16.417 77%     
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ and     ̅̅ ̅̅̅     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are the means of the: 12 month forecast error, prior 12 month spot price change, daily change 
in ETF gold holdings, VIX
2
 and forecast revision between 12 and 6 months. Estimates of alphas and betas are from the regression indicated in 
column (1). The average estimates given in column (7) are found using the averages from column (2) and (3) and the estimates of alpha and 
betas given in columns (4), (5) and (6). Columns (8), (10) and (12) report the estimates with one coefficient held to zero. Columns (9), (11) and 





Figure 1: 12 Month Gold Forward Premium 
 
Figure 2: Producers and Speculators Futures Positions, No. of Contracts held 
 
Source: Commodities Futures Treading Commission (http://www.cftc.gov)   







































































































































Figure 5: Evolution of Coefficients (FP, 12m PSCH 12m), equation 4.3 
 
 































Figure 7: Evolution of Coefficients (FR, 12m-6m, FE, 12m), equation 4.7 
 
Figure 8: Total Exchange Traded Fund Gold Holdings and PM Fixing, Ounces ‘000s 
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